Joint work with Arved Fenner and Carina Mössinger
Presented at WWU (Münster), HVB Doctoral Seminar 2019 (Hannover), Research Seminar at the University of Paderborn 2019 (Paderborn), BGSE Summer School 2019 (Barcelona), DGF 2019 (Essen), SFA 2019 (Orlando), Banking Workshop 2019 (Münster), PFMC 2019 (Paris), Australasian Finance & Banking Conference 2019 (Sydney), Sydney Banking and Financial Stability Conference 2019 (Sydney), IBEFA 2020 (San Diego), SGF 2020 (Zürich, accepted but canceled), FFI 2020 (Stockholm), Research Seminar in Contract Theory, Banking and Money at the University of Zurich 2020 (Zurich), Bundesbank Research Seminar 2020 (online), AFA 2021 (online), NFA (online), “Credit Risk over the Business Cycle” conference organized by Deutsche Bundesbank, FRIC Center, and CEPR (online), EUROFIDAI Paris December 2021 Finance Meeting (online), European DataWarehouse Winter Research Update Webinar in 2022 (online), FIRS 2023 (Vancouver), CEBRA 2023 (New York)
Abstract: We investigate the replenishment of 102 asset-backed securities (ABS) that are backed by more than 1.7 million small- and medium-sized enterprise loans and that need to be clearly distinguished from Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs). Based on our extensive data set from 2012 to 2017 obtained from the only central loan-level repository for ABS in Europe, we reveal that loans added to securitized loan portfolios after the transactions' closing perform worse than loans being part of the initial portfolio. On average, we find that loans added to securitized loan portfolios demonstrate a 0.42 percentage points higher probability of default. We additionally provide evidence that originators induce these performance differences by adding low-quality loans to securitized loan portfolios. At issuance, investors seem not to be aware of the potential negative impact of portfolio replenishment and demand lower instead of higher yield spreads if the respective portfolio is more prone to portfolio replenishment. During the ABS term, investors adjust their opinion and pay a lower price for those tranches whose underlying loan portfolio is replenished more strongly. The observed adverse behavior by originators is mitigated by their reputation efforts, by increasing transparency in the ABS market, as for example per the European Central Bank's loan-level initiative, and most effectively by their interaction.