Politicians' outside earnings and electoral competition

Becker J, Peichl A, Rincke J


Abstract
This paper deals with the impact of electoral competition on politicians' outside earnings. In our framework, politicians face a tradeoff between allocating their time to political effort or to an alternative use generating outside earnings. The main hypothesis is that the amount of time spent on outside work is negatively related to the degree of electoral competition. We test this hypothesis using a new dataset on outside earnings of members of the German federal assembly and find that politicians facing low competition have substantially higher outside earnings.

Keywords
Political competition Outside earnings Political rents us-senate government legislators corruption systems states income



Publication type
Article in Journal

Publication status
Published

Year
2009

Journal
PUBLIC CHOICE

Volume
140

Issue
3-4

Start page
379

End page
394

Pages range
379-394

Language
English

ISSN
0048-5829

Affiliation
Univ Oxford, Univ Oxford, IZA Inst Study Labor, Univ Munich