The Structure of Firm-Specific Labour Unions
Zusammenfassung
We apply a model with two types of labour where each group decides on whether it prefers to be represented by an independent craft-specific labour union or by a joint union. Applying the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution, we find that it is beneficial for at least one group of labourers to form its own independent union - and in some cases even both groups are worse off under a joint union. Consequently, a joint union must be considered as a rather unstable institution. Correspondingly, profits are lower if the firm bargains with two independent craft unions.
Zitieren als
Upmann, T., & Müller, J. (2014). The Structure of Firm-Specific Labour Unions. Journal of Instititutional and Theoretical Economics, 170(2), 336–364.Details
Publikationstyp
Forschungsartikel (Zeitschrift)
Begutachtet
Ja
Publikationsstatus
Veröffentlicht
Jahr
2014
Fachzeitschrift
Journal of Instititutional and Theoretical Economics
Band
170
Ausgabe
2
Erste Seite
336
Letzte Seite
364
Sprache
Englisch
DOI
Gesamter Text