Corporate Governance and Employee Power in the Boardroom: An Applied Game Theoretic Analysis
Zusammenfassung
The debate on employee representation on corporate boards has received considerable attention from scholars and politicians around the world. We provide new insights to this ongoing discussion by applying power indices from game theory to examine the actual voting power of employees on boards and its effect on firm performance. Based on unique panel data on the largest listed companies in Germany, we find an inverse U-shaped relationship between labor power and Tobin's Q. Moderate employee participation in corporate board decision-making can enhance firm value.
Schlüsselwörter
Applied game theory; Co-determination; Corporate governance; Power index
Zitieren als
Balsmeier, B., Berming, A., & Dilger, A. (2013). Corporate Governance and Employee Power in the Boardroom: An Applied Game Theoretic Analysis. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 91, 51–74.Details
Publikationstyp
Forschungsartikel (Zeitschrift)
Begutachtet
Ja
Publikationsstatus
Veröffentlicht
Jahr
2013
Fachzeitschrift
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Band
91
Erste Seite
51
Letzte Seite
74
Sprache
Englisch
DOI
Gesamter Text