Cheating Alone and in Teams
Dilger, Alexander
Zusammenfassung
There is a reward for a project that can be increased through ability, effort, and cheating. This is analysed for one agent and a team of two. As an extension, a preference for honesty is added, which can prevent cheating but not without limit and not so easily in the team context.
Schlüsselwörter
Ability; Cheating; Doping; Effort; Honesty; Incentive; Project; Sports; Team
Publikationstyp
Arbeitspapier / Working Paper
Begutachtet
Nein
Publikationsstatus
Veröffentlicht
Jahr
2021
Herausgeber
Dilger, Alexander
Band
1/2021
Reihe
Diskussionspapier des Instituts für Organisationsökonomik
Verlag
Institut für Organisationsökonomik
Ort
Münster
Sprache
Englisch
ISSN
2191-2475
Gesamter Text