Doping in Teams: A Simple Decision Theoretic Model
Dilger Alexander
Zusammenfassung
A simple decision theoretic model shows the doping incentives for a member of a professional sports team. Depending on the detection probability and the punishment, a sportsman dopes not at all, at a medium or at the maximal level. The whole team has a higher incentive than an individual team member that at least some of its members dope. That there are not many proven cases of doping in team sports could be because doping is less effective or because the incentives to cover it are higher than in individual sports.
Publikationstyp
Sonstige wissenschaftliche Veröffentlichung
Publikationsstatus
Veröffentlicht
Jahr
2017
Band
6/2017
Reihe
Diskussionspapier des Instituts für Organisationsökonomik
Verlag
Institut für Organisationsökonomik
Ort
Münster
Sprache
Englisch
ISSN
2191-2475
Gesamter Text