The Structure of Firm-Specific Labour Unions
Upmann Thorsten, Müller Julia
Zusammenfassung
We apply a model with two types of labour where each group decides on whether it prefers to be represented by an independent craft-specific labour union or by a joint union. Applying the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution, we find that it is beneficial for at least one group of labourers to form its own independent union - and in some cases even both groups are worse off under a joint union. Consequently, a joint union must be considered as a rather unstable institution. Correspondingly, profits are lower if the firm bargains with two independent craft unions.
Publikationstyp
Forschungsartikel (Zeitschrift)
Begutachtet
Ja
Publikationsstatus
Veröffentlicht
Jahr
2014
Fachzeitschrift
Journal of Instititutional and Theoretical Economics
Band
170
Ausgabe
2
Erste Seite
336
Letzte Seite
364
Sprache
Englisch
DOI
Gesamter Text