Executive Turnover and Outside Directors on Two-Tiered Boards

Balsmeier Benjamin, Buchwald Achim, Dilger Alexander


Zusammenfassung
This paper examines the determinants of executive turnover on two-tiered boards, emphasizing the monitoring role of supervisory board members with simultaneous outside directorships. Based on a unique sample of executives from large German firms, we find that outside supervisory board members generally increase executive turnover at the firms they monitor. This influence is especially pronounced when outside supervisory board members are simultaneously active as managers themselves and capital control is rather weak. These results suggest that external managers on supervisory boards enhance the monitoring intensity and substitute for weak capital control in the absence of large shareholders.



Publikationstyp
Forschungsartikel (Zeitschrift)

Begutachtet
Ja

Publikationsstatus
Veröffentlicht

Jahr
2015

Fachzeitschrift
Managerial and Decision Economics

Band
36

Ausgabe
3

Erste Seite
158

Letzte Seite
176

Sprache
Englisch

ISSN
0143-6570

DOI

Gesamter Text