Hazard Rates and Personal Interdependencies in Supervisory Boards of DAX Companies
Balsmeier Benjamin, Dilger Alexander, Lingens Jörg
Abstract
We estimate and analyse the hazard rates of members of the supervisory board inGerman leading companies, listed in the DAX, with a special focus on personalinterdependencies with other supervisory boards and executives committees. We findfundamental differences between supervisory board members representing owners andthose representing employees. Several variables measuring personal interdependenciesare only relevant for the former whereas the latter have a longer tenure if the salary ofthe executives is higher, which can be interpreted as an indicator of collusion.
Publication type
Other scientific publication
Publication status
Published
Year
2010
Volume
10-19
Title of series
Discussion Paper 10-19 der German Economic Assocation of Business Administration
Language
English
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