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**Which Qualifications Does a Minister of the  
German Federal Government Need to Be Reoccupied?**

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Center for Interdisciplinary Economics  
Discussion Paper

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**Summary**

The objective pursued by this study is to raise the question whether there exists a correlation between the reoccupation of ministers of the German Federal Government and their particular socio-demographic characteristics or human capital. Therefore, this paper depicts the decision of the German Federal Chancellor of reoccupation for all ministers between 1949 and 2012 by running several ordinal regression analyses. The results reveal that the age, the years of membership in the German Bundestag or in the party, as well as previous leaderships of German non-partisan non-profit organisations or business corporations significantly increase the probability of reoccupation. In addition, this analysis points out that the comparably prominent position of the vice chancellor also raises the chance to be reappointed.

JEL-Codes: C81, J24, L88, M53, O52

# **Welche Qualifikationen braucht ein Minister der deutschen Bundesregierung, um im Amt zu bleiben?**

## **Zusammenfassung**

Untersuchungsgegenstand dieser Studie ist die Fragestellung, ob ein Zusammenhang zwischen der Wiederberufung von Ministern der deutschen Bundesregierung und ihren jeweiligen soziodemographischen Eigenschaften oder ihrem Humankapital besteht. Zu diesem Zweck bildet dieses Papier die Entscheidung des/der deutschen Bundeskanzlers/in über eine Wiederberufung für alle Minister zwischen 1949 und 2012 durch die Berechnung diverser ordinaler Regressionsanalysen ab. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass sowohl das Alter, die Mitgliedschaftsdauer im deutschen Bundestag oder in der Partei als auch frühere Führungspositionen in deutschen nicht-politischen Non-Profit-Organisationen oder Unternehmen signifikant die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Wiederberufung erhöhen. Außerdem stellt diese Analyse heraus, dass die vergleichsweise prominente Position des Vizekanzlers auch die Chance, wiederberufen zu werden, signifikant erhöht.

Im Internet unter:

[http://www.wiwi.uni-muenster.de/ciw/forschen/downloads/DP-CIW\\_02\\_2013.pdf](http://www.wiwi.uni-muenster.de/ciw/forschen/downloads/DP-CIW_02_2013.pdf)

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# **Which Qualifications Does a Minister of the German Federal Government Need to Be Reoccupied?\***

## **1. Introduction and Literature Review**

Among other topics, the majority of political economic research, and especially the field of public choice, deals with elections and the voting behaviour of citizens. So far, only few research results about the determinants of personnel decisions within federal governments are available. This paper asks which qualifications increase the probability of reoccupation for a minister of the German Federal Government. Hence, I am going to analyse in how far the Federal Chancellor's decision about the reoccupation of a minister is influenced by the candidate's individual characteristics and degrees of human capital.

Aside from the macroeconomic framework or policies, current investigations apply new and different views on politicians by investigating them on the individual level. Structural differences concerning socio-demographic characteristics, physical attractiveness, human capital, and career patterns are analysed by economists and political scientists. Concentrating on the personal appearance of politicians, several economists showed that physical attractiveness of politicians increases their electoral success (see Berggren et al. 2007, Berggren et al. 2010, King and Leigh 2009). Moreover, Kaase (1994) and Sabatini (2012) pointed out the context of the politician's presence or personalisation on television and their effect on voters' behaviour.

Focusing on human capital and career patterns in politics, Mattozzi and Merlo (2008) presented a model that differentiates between career politicians and political careers. While career politicians are defined as individuals who have appointments as a politician until their retirement, the term political careers refers to individuals who leave the political sector and start working in business corporations before their retirement. Early empirical evidence for a change in career patterns was presented by Edinger (1961), who investigated the change of social background, as well as the education of German politicians between the totalitarian Nazi regime and the democratic Federal Republic of Germany (1936 to 1956). Political career paths of members of the European Parliament are the subject of Scarrow's (1997) analysis. This study pointed out the correlation between domestic political careers and seats in the

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European Parliament. The author found out that the parliament becomes more attractive for delegates who opt for a comparably long European career. Following this finding, she assumed that those politicians pursue to raise the European Parliament's power and prestige in comparison to other European and domestic institutions. Especially for Germany (and Britain) the author observed an attraction of politicians with an interest in European politics as such. One more examination of political careers across territorial levels was published by Stolz (2003). He compared current career movements between regional and national parliaments of multileveled Western democracies, Germany included. For West Germany the results revealed that this state is characterised by its highly integrated party system without significant evidence for the existence of regional political networks. Amongst other results, Stolz concluded that the German political class, which is defined as politicians who act like a collective person in and for itself (see Beyme 1993,1996, Borchert and Golsch 1995, Stolz 2003) is geared less to strong hierarchical careers towards the federal level (See Stolz 2003, 230-231).

A sociological investigation of career patterns was given by Michael Hartmann (2009) who investigated the change of US-government's composition (especially the inner cabinet) concerning socio-demographic or educational characteristics and social connectedness from 1949 to 2009. He showed that almost two thirds of the analysed cabinet members derived from a non-elitist social background in the first period from 1945 to 1980, while in the second period, from 1981 to 2009, nearly 70 per cent of the investigated top politicians stemmed from an elitist background. Besides, Scharfenkamp and Dilger (2012) investigated differences in social background, education, as well as political or economic human capital between chancellors, vice chancellors, and ministers of the inner or residual cabinet. The sample contained all members of the German Federal Governments between 1949 and 2009. Surprisingly, the results revealed that members of the inner cabinet show the highest educational level as well as the most advantageous social background. Only the expertise in the actual headed department is the highest for the heads of the Federal Governments, namely the chancellors. Furthermore, vice chancellors seem to have the highest average number of seats in German business corporations before their appointment in the Federal Government.

This literature review showed that no previous investigations examined yet the socio-demographic characteristics and qualifications of ministers that influence the probability of a reoccupation in the German Federal Government.

In this paper, it will be shown that the Federal Chancellor's decision of a minister's reoccupation is affected by different types of human capital, as well as by socio-demographic characteristics. Therefore, this paper begins with a description of the theoretical framework, followed by a presentation of the derived hypotheses. After that, the present dataset, as well as the corresponding descriptive statistics are explained. In the subsequent chapter, the results of the correlation tests and analysed ordinal regression models are discussed. Finally, a summary of the main results and a proposal for further research is presented in the last chapter.

## 2. Hypotheses

The German Federal Government defines the position of the Federal Chancellor as the head of the Federal cabinet. He or she decides about the number and terms of ministries. Furthermore, the chancellor makes a binding proposal to the German Federal President about the head of each ministry (see German Federal Government 2012).

Besides the question of the chancellor's choice for the initial occupation of a minister, this analysis concentrates on characteristics of ministers which determine a reoccupation. Therefore, three different types of characteristics are identified to illustrate the individual careers of the investigated politicians. These are socio-demographic characteristics, political and general human capital.

The first group of socio-demographic characteristics consists of the (minister's) gender and age at the latest inauguration. Due to the fact that from 1949 to 2009 more men than women worked as professional politicians (this is also revealed by the following descriptive statistics of this sample), the assumption arises that men are more probably reoccupied as a head of a ministry than women. This assumption is formulated by the first hypothesis:

*H1: The probability of reoccupation is higher for men than for women.*

In general, an advancing age of a minister accounts for a comparably higher number of lifetime experience, and maybe knowledge (as well). Simultaneously, it reduces the expected future lifetime earnings for the particular individual. Following this, the Federal Chancellor has two different (types of) incentives to reoccupy a comparably older minister than a younger one. Concerning the higher lifetime experience, the Federal Chancellor might expect an older candidate to lead the ministry in a more sovereign way than a younger competitor. The other way round, older ministers might be reoccupied more probably because the

chancellor wants to do them a favour by considering their lower expected lifetime income. Hence, hypothesis 2 assumes that an advanced age at inauguration increases the probability of reoccupation.

*H2: The higher the age at inauguration, the higher is the probability of reoccupation.*

Oi (1962) and Becker (1962, 1964) are the most popular and first representatives of the basic theory about human capital. In short, there exists a differentiation between general and specific human capital. This difference bases on the assumption that specific human capital includes skills and knowledge whose increasing effect on an individual's productivity is bound to a specific appointment, corporation, or even branch. By contrast, the raising impact of general human capital on an individual's productivity is independent from the appointment, corporation, or branch. In this paper, political human capital is defined as the specific type, including the following items.

The membership in the German Bundestag depicts branch-specific human capital that describes knowledge and skills which derive from the individual's parliamentary work on the federal level. This kind of human capital is specific in so far that it only improves the minister's productivity if he has a political appointment on the federal level. Thus, the probability of a reoccupation of a minister might be raised by a longer membership in the German parliament. This presumption will be tested by formulating hypothesis 3.

*H3: The longer the membership in the German Bundestag, the higher is the probability of reoccupation.*

Corresponding to the political network in Germany that Stolz (2003) investigated in his paper, the individual duration of membership in a particular party might have an impact on the Federal Chancellor's decision about a (re-)occupation of a minister. Therefore, the following hypothesis includes the assumption that a longer membership in a particular party improves the probability of reoccupation since this might lead to better personal knowledge of (party) colleagues as well as to higher branch-specific human capital.

*H4: The longer the membership in the party, the higher is the probability of reoccupation.*

Along the same lines, the following argumentation bases on the prominent position of the minority party's top candidate. Thus, I assume that the prominent function of a vice chancellor enhances the probability of reoccupation. Hypothesis 5 describes this assumption.

*H5: The probability of reoccupation is higher for ministers who are vice chancellor than for those who are not.*

Following the segmentation of Hartmann (2009), the Federal Government can be separated in an inner and residual cabinet. This separation is necessary in order to define the political elite that consist of the chancellor, his/her deputy, and the inner cabinet, which includes the ministers of foreign affairs, interior, economics, finance, justice, and defence. Aside from other qualifications, and following the political class approach which claims that professional politicians have incentives to behave and decide as a collective actor in and for itself (see Beyme 1993, 1996, Borchert and Golsch 1995, Stolz 2003), the chancellor has an incentive to favour ministers of the inner cabinet regarding the question of reoccupation due to the social pressure of the common social elite and expected loyalty. So, the sixth hypothesis formulates the assumption that being a member of the inner cabinet increases the probability of being reoccupied.

*H6: The probability of reoccupation is higher for ministers of the inner cabinet than for those of the residual cabinet.*

Following the above-mentioned term of general human capital, I subsume the (academic) education, as well as leadership qualities gained from former appointments in German non-profit organisations or in the executive or supervisory board of a business corporation to this definition. This type of human capital was generated within other institutions than professional politics but can improve the ministers' productivity while they are heading their department.

Concerning the Federal Chancellor's decision of reoccupation, I assume that he or she aims to (re-)appoint ministers with the highest possible educational level. So in general, ministers without a university degree should have lower chances to be reoccupied than graduates.

*H7: The probability of reoccupation is higher for ministers with a university degree than for those without a university degree.*

Keeping to the point of leadership qualities, ministers who worked in a leading position before their occupation in the Federal Government might have learned and gained outstanding abilities and knowledge about how to head a department. Hence, previous appointments as a (vice) president of a German non-partisan non-profit organisation or membership in an executive or supervisory board of a German business corporation are considered here. Thus,

the Federal Chancellor might evaluate former appointments in these corporate bodies as a special qualification raising a minister's productivity and performance. Finally, hypothesis 8 states that former leaderships improve the chance of a minister to be reappointed by the Federal Chancellor.

*H8: The probability of reoccupation is higher for ministers with former leading appointments in a German non-profit organisation or business corporations than for those without comparable appointments.*

### **3. Sample Composition and Descriptive Statistics**

The present data record contains all governments (after elections) from 1949 to 2012, including cabinet reshuffles during an election period. Personal data are available for 194 persons, so that the sample consists of all ministers who were member of the German Federal Governments at the opening of each year. However, no chancellors are considered in this dataset and the following analysis because of the assumption that the chancellor leads the decision of (re)occupation of the cabinet.

#### **3.1. Dependent Variable**

In the following, the dependent variable is the maximum number of years that a minister was in the German Federal Government before his or her exit. Admittedly, all ministers of the actual government (in 2012) are considered with their current appointment in the Federal Government.

#### **3.2. Explanatory Variables**

The curriculums vitae of all ministers were collected by using the database 'Munzinger Archive' and the official homepages of the ministries and parties (see Munzinger Archive 2012). The analysed individual data are categorised in three groups of socio-demographic characteristics, political human capital, as well as general human capital. In the following, the particular characteristics of each group will be described. Subsequently, the measurement of the items as well as the corresponding descriptive statistics will be presented. Table 1 provides an overview of the descriptive statistics of all items considered:

**Table 1: Descriptive Statistics**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Obs.</b>	<b>Minimum</b>	<b>Maximum</b>	<b>Mean</b>
Years of Reoccupation	194	0	22	4.47 [3.60]
Age at Latest Inauguration	194	30	79	56.08 [8.29]
Membership of the German Bundestag (in Years)	194	0	49	12.21 [8.15]
Membership in the Party (in Years)	194	0	49	23.49 [11.51]
Former Leading Positions	194	0	3	1.67 [1.38]
				<b>Frequency</b>
Men	194			169 [87.10 %]
Vice Chancellor	194			12 [6.20 %]
Member of the Inner Cabinet	194			68 [35.10 %]
Intermittent Reoccupation	194			10 [5.20 %]
University Degree	194			158 [81.40%]
<i>Party</i>				
Crossbench	194			4 [2.10 %]
BHE	194			2 [1.00 %]
DP	194			1 [0.50 %]
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	194			4 [2.10 %]
SPD	194			59 [30.40 %]
FDP	194			35 [18.40 %]
CDU & CSU	194			89 [45.90 %]

*Notes: In the first part of the table, the values in brackets are the corresponding standard deviations of the metric items. Conversely, the values in brackets refer to the percentage of the analysed sample for all nominal variables.*

First of all, the used socio-demographic characteristics are the gender and age at the latest inauguration of each analysed individual. The nominal scaled item gender is measured by a dummy variable for men, so that women are the defined as the reference category. The descriptive statistics indicate that a strong majority of ministers (87.10 per cent) are male.

By contrast, the age at the latest inauguration is measured in years and is depicted by a metric variable. In particular, the average age of the investigated ministers is 56 years with a standard deviation of approximately 8 years. The results correspond to a minimum age of 30 years and a maximum age of 79 years.

Second, political human capital is measured by the years of membership in the German Bundestag or in a party, being vice chancellor as well as being a minister of the inner cabinet. The measurement of the membership of the German Bundestag is counted in years. The results reveal that a minister's average membership in the German Bundestag is 12.21 years, corresponding to a minimum of null years as well as a maximum of 49 years. The standard deviation for this item is 8.15.

Likewise, the membership in a party is measured in years. The average membership in a party is 23.49 years with a standard deviation of 11.51 years. The corresponding minimum membership is null years, while the maximum membership is 49 years.

Furthermore, vice chancellors are ministers of the federal government who head a ministry by simultaneously having the deputy function. To control for this exceptional position of vice chancellors, a dummy variable is implemented in the forthcoming empirical analysis. In this sample, 12 of 194 individuals (6.20 per cent) are vice chancellors.

Ministers are categorised into those of the inner or residual cabinet. In other words, the corresponding dummy variable controls for memberships of the inner cabinet, which consists of the ministers of foreign affairs, interior, economics, finance, justice, and defence. Hence, the reference category is given by the residual cabinet that contains all other ministers like the minister for family affairs or the minister of sciences. Finally, the descriptive statistics show that 68 of 194 ministers (35.10 per cent) are part of the inner cabinet.

Third, general human capital is illustrated by the education and former appointments in a German non-profit organisation or business corporation. Ultimately, the degree of education is measured by using a dummy variable that controls for members with or without an academic graduation. Not surprisingly, the majority of ministers (81.40 per cent) reached an academic graduation before their appointment in the Federal Government.

Former leadership appointments in a German non-partisan non-profit organisation, as well as memberships in an executive or supervisory board of a German business corporation are considered in this analysis. In detail, three categories are defined. First of all, previous

presidencies or vice presidencies in non-profit organisations depict the first category. By contrast, the second and third category includes memberships in the executive board or supervisory board of a German business corporation. A minister can receive one point per category. The final item follows a range from a minimum score of null to a maximum score of three. These scores are calculated by adding each category once. For example, a former president of a non-profit organisation would get one point. In case that a minister has no previous leadership appointment, he receives a score of null points. Conversely, a minister who led a non-profit-organisation and also was a member of an executive and of a supervisory board receives three points. The average score of previous leaderships accounts for 1.67 with a standard deviation of 1.38.

Finally, I control for the ideological bias of the party that each analysed individual belongs to. Therefore the variable 'party' contains all German parties that participated in the German Federal Government between 1949 and 2012. First of all, 4 individuals of the sample (2.10 per cent) were members of the investigated Federal Governments but belonged to no party. The right wing parties BHE (Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten) and DP (Deutsche Partei) were founded in 1950 and in 1869 respectively. After a fusion of both parties in 1961, only the DP remained until 1980, so that a comparably small percentage (1.00 per cent and 0.50 per cent) of previous members is included in this sample (see Decker & Neu 2007). Conversely, the sample consists to 30.4 per cent of members of the left-centre party SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands). While 2.1 per cent of the sample are members of the ecological focused party Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 18 per cent are members of the liberal FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei). In addition, the majority of the sample (with 45.9 per cent) are members of the right-centre parties CDU (Christlich Demokratische Union) or CSU (Christlich Soziale Union) (see Decker and Neu 2007).

The data sample also includes ministers who were reoccupied after a former exit of the German Federal Government. Actually, 5.20 per cent of the investigated individuals show intermittent reoccupations. Therefore, a dummy variable controls whether the years of reoccupation include interruptions in the forthcoming analysis.

#### **4. Empirical Results**

In this chapter, the correlation between the maximum of reoccupations and the socio-demographic characteristics as well as human capital will be analysed. By extension, the results of the Spearman-Rho test for metric items as well as the Chi-Square test for nominal

items are presented here. Moreover, the combined effect of all explanatory variables on the probability of reoccupation will be clarified by running four ordinal regression analyses (see e.g. Greene 2012).

The isolated correlations of each independent variable on the years of reoccupation are tested by calculating the Spearman-Rho coefficient for all metric items. Due to the fact that the results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests revealed that all metric items are not normally distributed, the Spearman-Rho coefficient is calculated. Nevertheless, the correlation between the years of reoccupation and all nominal explanatory variables is tested by running a Chi-Square test. The results of all tests are summed up in Table 2:

**Table 2: Results of the Spearman-Rho and Chi-Square Tests**

Variable	Spearman-Rho Test	Chi-Square Test
Man (Reference: Woman)		19.600
Age at Latest Inauguration	0.227**	
Membership in the German Bundestag (in Years)	0.303**	
Membership in the Party (in Years)	0.170**	
Vice Chancellor (Reference: No Vice Chancellor)		38.796**
Member of the Inner Cabinet (Reference: Member of the Residual Cabinet)		0.299
Intermittent Reoccupation (Reference: Continued Reoccupation)		43.115**
University Degree (Reference: No University Degree)		20.499
Former Leading Positions	0.541**	
Party		68.710

*Note: \*\* denotes significance at the 1 per cent level.*

Obviously, there is no association between the gender of a minister and the years of reoccupation. Conversely, the age at the latest inauguration, the membership in the German Bundestag or party, as well as being a vice chancellor significantly correlate with the dependent variable. Nevertheless, no significant association can be found for members of the inner cabinet. Moreover, there seems to be a significant correlation between intermittent reoccupations and the number of former leaderships and the years of reoccupation. There are no significant results for reaching a university degree or a particular party that a minister belongs to. All significant results are on the high confidence level of 99 per cent.

In the following, the results of four ordinal regression analyses are presented. Based on the result that being a vice chancellor is significantly associated with the years in office, two separate models are calculated. While one model includes all ministers (194 individuals), the other one does not consider vice chancellors (182 individuals). In addition, a strong and significant correlation is identified between the years of membership in the German Bundestag and the years of membership in the party. So, two more separations of the model are necessary to control for multicollinearity. Table 3 below gives an overview of the results.

The results of the four regression models point out that the gender of a minister has no significant impact on the probability of reoccupation. Hence, hypothesis 1, that men have a higher probability to be reoccupied than women, has to be rejected.

The age at the latest inauguration has a significant increasing impact on the probability of reoccupation. This effect is supported by each model and is significant on the five to one per cent levels. In other words, the second hypothesis, that older ministers have a higher probability to be reoccupied than younger ones, is confirmed here.

The years of memberships in the German Bundestag, as well as in the party, indicate a significant positive influence on the probability of reoccupation, too. These correlations are significant on the one per cent levels in the particular models. Following these results, the third and fourth hypotheses are supported as well.

As the Chi-Square test indicated before, being a vice chancellor increases the probability of reoccupation. This effect is significant in both models (on the ten per cent level in the first model, on the five per cent level in the second analysis). Although it is true that the significance of the first model is comparably weak, hypothesis 5 is confirmed by the second model.

No effect of heading a particular ministry or reaching a university degree is found here. This means that being a member of the inner cabinet or an academic graduate does not significantly influence the probability of reoccupation in any of the examined models. In conclusion, the sixth and seventh hypotheses have to be rejected.

**Table 3: Results of the Ordinal Regression Analyses**

<b>Dependent Variable: Maximum Years of Reoccupations</b>	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 4</b>
Man (Reference: Woman)	-.374 [.397]	-.363 [.397]	-.286 [.398]	-.280 [.398]
Age at Latest Inauguration (in Years)	.043** [.017]	.043** [.017].	.043** [.017]	.042* [.017]
Membership of the German Bundestag (in Years)	.061** [.018]		.062** [.019]	
Membership of Party (in Years)		.036** [.013]		.036** [.014]
Vice Chancellor (Reference: No Vice Chancellor)	1.163* [.571]	1.103# [.570]		
Member of the Inner Cabinet (Reference: Member of the Residual Cabinet)	.419 [294]	.383 [.296]	.344 [.306]	.289 [.310]
Intermittent Reoccupation (Reference: Continued Reoccupation)	-.921 [.600]	-1.039# [.598]	-1.449* [.646]	-1.583* [.640]
University degree (Reference: No University Degree)	.012 [.358]	-.161 [.351]	-.035 [.380]	-.191 [.371]
Former Leading Positions	1.039*** [.124]	1.076*** [.125]	1.044*** [.128]	1.070*** [.128]
<i>Party (Reference: CDU &amp; CSU)</i>				
Crossbench	-1.328 [.986]	-1.159 [1.007]	-1.257 [.989]	-1.107 [1.013]
BHE	.551 [1.283]	.530 [1.286]	.572 [1.284]	.537 [1.288]
DP	1.229 [1.808]	1.091 [1.806]	1.245 [1.813]	1.095 [1.811]
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	-.414 [.939]	-.705 [.935]	-.002 [1.070]	-.379 [1.068]
SPD	-.317 [.313]	-.562# [.322]	-.171 [.319]	-.416 [.327]
FDP	-.557 [.393]	-.553 [.394]	-.612 [.415]	-.593 [.417]
Significance	.000	.000	.000	.000
N	194	194	182	182
-2LogLikelihood	798.347	802.894	733.534	740.126
Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>				
Cox and Snell	.522	.514	.527	.517
Nagelkerke	.526	.518	.532	.522
McFadden	.152	.149	.156	.152

Note: #, \*, \*\* and \*\*\* denote significance at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent, 1 per cent and 1 per mill levels respectively.

Surprisingly, the number of former leading positions in German non-partisan non-profit or business-corporations increases the probability of reoccupation significantly on the one per mill level in each model. Finally, the last hypothesis, that previous leadership positions increase the chances of ministers to be reoccupied by the Federal Chancellor, is supported by all regression models.

The variable that controls for intermittent reoccupations is significant in both regression models that investigate the ministers excluding vice chancellors. Significant negative coefficients lead to the result that being reoccupied after a former exit from the German Federal Government decreases the probability of being reoccupied further. Besides, this association is not, or only weakly, significant in the regression models that include vice chancellors.

Finally, no significant impacts are found for being a member of a particular party in any of the analysed ordinal regression models. Only a weakly significant (ten per cent level) decreasing impact is found for the SPD compared to the reference category of being a member of the CDU or CSU.

## **5. Conclusions**

Regarding the composition of the German Federal Government, the Federal Chancellor has the right to opt for or against a (partially) replacement of his/her headed cabinet. Aside from the actual performance, the question arises which individual characteristics significantly influence the chances of a minister to be reappointed in the following year. Hence, this paper investigated in how far socio-demographic characteristics but also human capital might be implemented in the decision of the Federal Chancellor. The results of the correlation tests and ordinal regression models clarify that age is the only socio-demographic characteristic that significantly influences the chance of reoccupation. In this analysis, the individual age of a minister has a positive impact on the chance to be reappointed. Maybe because of the fact that 87.10 per cent of the investigated ministers are male, no significant effects of the gender on the probability of reoccupation is found. In conclusion, no discrimination of women in this regard can be found here.

Focusing on political or branch-specific human capital, the results reveal that both more years of experience in the German Bundestag or in the particular party have a significantly positive effect on the probability to be reappointed. Likewise, this investigation also included the

prominent position of the vice chancellor. This position is usually occupied by the minority party's top candidate of the actual governing coalition. So, the ordinal regression analyses indicate that this prominent position leads to a higher probability of reoccupation for the incumbent. By contrast, the study points out that the probability of reoccupation is not affected by the classification of the headed ministry. In other words, the distinction between ministers of the inner or residual cabinets shows no significant impact on the dependent variable. However, being reoccupied after a previous exit of the German Federal Government significantly decreases the chance to be reappointed. By extension, the analysis of the sample that excludes vice chancellors clarifies that intermittent reoccupations significantly reduce the chance of reoccupation. Granted, these results are not (or only weakly significantly) supported by the ordinal regressions that examine the entire sample.

General human capital, in terms of education and knowledge or skills that arise from previous leading positions in German non-partisan non-profit-organisations or business corporations, has different impacts on the investigated item. Obviously, the decision of the Federal Chancellor is not affected by the education of the particular minister. This is based on the empirical result that an academic graduation does not significantly influence the probability of reoccupation in any model. Like with gender, this finding could probably depend on the fact that 81.40 per cent of the sample has a university degree. Consequently, an academic graduation might be considered as a basic requirement to work in the Federal Government. Regardless, previous leading positions in German non-profit-organisations or business corporations significantly increase the chance of a minister to be reappointed by the Federal Chancellor. Indeed, the assumption that skills and knowledge that were gained in former leaderships are determinants of the Federal Chancellor's decision of reoccupying a minister is confirmed.

Finally, no significant effects due to differences in the ideological biases of parties are found here.

Of course this study can be further improved in the future. One basic improvement could be a change of the empirical method. Thus, using a hazard regression analysis for recurrent events might lead to better and more valid results concerning the probability of 'surviving' the next year as a minister. Furthermore, it might be interesting to find an index for each minister that enables the comparison of performance in the previous year. With a particular view on future federal elections, this study could also control for the popularity of a minister because of the assumption that popular ministers might be reappointed more likely by the head of the Federal

Government. Finally, the implementation of the Federal Chancellors' characteristics within the model could clarify in how far his or her own qualifications lead to particular personnel decisions.

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