Tax enforcement and tax havens under formula apportionment

Becker J, Fuest C


Zusammenfassung
In this paper, we consider optimal tax enforcement policy in the presence of profit shifting toward tax havens. We show that, under separate accounting, tax enforcement levels may be too high due to negative fiscal externalities. In contrast, under formula apportionment, tax enforcement is likely to be too low due to positive externalities of tax enforcement. Our results challenge recent contributions arguing that, under formula apportionment, there is a tendency toward inefficiently high levels of (effective) tax rates.

Schlüsselwörter
Corporate taxation Foreign direct investment corporate-income european-union competition taxation multinationals evasion reform firms



Publikationstyp
Aufsatz (Zeitschrift)

Publikationsstatus
Veröffentlicht

Jahr
2010

Fachzeitschrift
INTERNATIONAL TAX AND PUBLIC FINANCE

Band
17

Ausgabe
3

Erste Seite
217

Letzte Seite
235

Seiten
217-235

Sprache
Englisch

ISSN
0927-5940

Affiliierungen
Univ Oxford, Univ Oxford