Politicians' outside earnings and electoral competition

Becker J, Peichl A, Rincke J


Zusammenfassung
This paper deals with the impact of electoral competition on politicians' outside earnings. In our framework, politicians face a tradeoff between allocating their time to political effort or to an alternative use generating outside earnings. The main hypothesis is that the amount of time spent on outside work is negatively related to the degree of electoral competition. We test this hypothesis using a new dataset on outside earnings of members of the German federal assembly and find that politicians facing low competition have substantially higher outside earnings.

Schlüsselwörter
Political competition Outside earnings Political rents us-senate government legislators corruption systems states income



Publikationstyp
Aufsatz (Zeitschrift)

Publikationsstatus
Veröffentlicht

Jahr
2009

Fachzeitschrift
PUBLIC CHOICE

Band
140

Ausgabe
3-4

Erste Seite
379

Letzte Seite
394

Seiten
379-394

Sprache
Englisch

ISSN
0048-5829

Affiliierungen
Univ Oxford, Univ Oxford, IZA Inst Study Labor, Univ Munich